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Akiachak Native Community v. United States Department of Interior,
827 F.3d 100 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
Lillian M. Alvernaz
Alaska Native Tribes have long been classified differently than
the federally recognized Indian tribes in the rest of the country. The
Akiachak decision contributes to the shifting treatment of Alaska Native
Tribes and clarifies their relationship with the federal government.1 The
ability to put land into trust is essential to the protection of generations to
come and the exercise of sovereign authority.2 By enabling Alaska Native
tribes the ability to petition to put tribally owned fee land in trust, the DOI
promotes and encourages tribal self-governance and empowerment.3
I. INTRODUCTION
After merely a decade of litigation, the Court determined
Akiachak Native Community v. United States Department of Interior to
be moot because of the significant changes the Department of the Interior
(“DOI”) had made to regulations stipulating when the federal government
can take land into trust.4 In an attempt to persuade the DOI to consider
taking land into trust, the Akiachak Native Community, Chalkyitsik
Village, and Tuluksak Native Community (together “Akiachak”)
emphasized the importance of trust status to Alaska Native Tribes: “trust
status would ‘ensure the protection’ of these lands ‘for future generations
of tribal members,’” and give Alaska Native Tribes the ability to “‘assert
undisputed jurisdiction over these lands.’”5
Traditionally, the DOI barred itself from putting fee land into trust
in Alaska.6 The 1980 version of the purpose and scope of land acquisitions
under the DOI, 25 C.F.R. §151.1 (“Alaska Exception”), restricted the
DOI’s land-into-trust abilities to all but one tribe in Alaska.7 In an effort
to change this restriction, Akiachak filed suit against the DOI, asserting
that the Alaska Exception violated the Indian Reorganization Act’s
(“IRA”) nondiscrimination provision, the Constitution, and
Administrative Procedure Act.8 In addition to Akiachak’s complaint, they
also sought an injunction requiring the DOI to waive the Alaska Exception

1.
Akiachak Native Cmty., v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 827
F.3d 100 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
2.
Id. at 102.
3.
Id.
4.
Id. at 105.
5.
Id.
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.
Id. at 103.
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and consider its applications of land to trust.9 The State of Alaska
intervened to retain the Alaska Exception.10
The District Court for the District for Columbia found for
Akiachak and found the DOI’s interpretation of the Alaska Exception to
be erroneous.11 Following the district court’s finding, the DOI amended
their regulations and voluntarily dropped the appeal.12 The State of Alaska
appealed in an effort to preclude the DOI from putting tribal land in trust
within the exterior boundaries of the state.13 The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held the controversy between
Akiachak and the DOI moot, and dismissed Alaska’s appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.14
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The relationship between Indian people and the federal
government is unique. Within this relationship is the distinct association
Alaska Native Tribes maintain with the federal government.15 The IRA of
1934 authorized the Secretary of Interior to obtain trust lands and establish
new reservations for federally recognized tribes.16 The IRA considered
Alaska Natives to be Indians within the meaning of the IRA, but it
excluded Alaska from the Secretary of Interior’s ability to take land into
trust.17 However, the ability to take land into trust was extended when
Alaska was still a territory, through an amendment to the IRA, the Act of
May 1, 1936.18 Additionally, the Secretary of Interior was authorized to
establish reservations on land previously designated for Indian use.19 This
amendment additionally established seven reservations and the federal
government obtained certain properties in trust.20
Further, Congress added an antidiscrimination provision almost
sixty years later.21 In this additional amendment, Act of May 31, 1994, the
DOI was prohibited from “classifying, enhancing, or diminishing the
privileges and immunities available to a federally recognized Indian tribe

9.
Id.
10.
Id.
11.
Id. at 102.
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.; see Act of May 1, 1936, 25 U.S.C. § 473a transferred to 25
U.S.C.A. § 5119 (2016).
19.
Id.; see Act of May 1, 1936, 25 U.S.C. § 473a transferred to 25
U.S.C.A. § 5119 (2016).
20.
Id.; see Act of May 1, 1936, 25 U.S.C. § 473a transferred to 25
U.S.C.A. § 5119 (2016).
21.
Id.
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relative to the privileges and immunities available to other federally
recognized tribes.”22
However, claims of aboriginal rights by Alaska Natives remained
unresolved.23 Aboriginal rights are “possessory rights of Indian tribes to
their aboriginal lands…extinguishable only by the United States.”24
Potential aboriginal rights claims hindered the new state of Alaska from
obtaining land from the US government under the Alaska Statehood Act.25
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”) of 1971 was passed
and “designed to settle all land claims by Alaska Natives” by extinguishing
aboriginal rights claims.26 ANCSA annulled all but one existing
reservation: the Metlakatla Indians who had no aboriginal rights claims
because they immigrated from Canada.27 As a result, Alaska Natives were
compensated forty-four million acres of land and $962.5 million,
dispersed amongst Alaska Native shareholder owned corporations.28
After ANCSA was enacted, Congress cancelled various
amendments to the IRA regarding land use for Alaska Natives, including
the Act of May 1, 1936.29 Notably, the IRA Alaska trust stipulation was
never repealed by Congress.30 The 1978 “Fredericks Opinion” to a tribe’s
application of land into trust outlined the DOI’s authority under ANCSA.31
The Fredericks Opinion established that “Congress intended permanently
to remove from trust status all Native land in Alaska except allotments and
the Annette Island Reserve.”32 The DOI codified the Fredericks Opinion
in 25 C.F.R. §151.1 (1980), preventing the acquisition of trust land in the
State of Alaska.33 This “Alaska Exception” was the core of Akiachak’s
complaint.34
Akiachak sought declaratory relief, specifically seeking an order
determining that the Alaska Exception “violated the IRA’s
antidiscrimination provision, the Constitution, and the Administrative
Procedure Act.”35 Additionally, Akiachak requested an injunction
22.
25 U.S.C. § 5123(g) (1934).
23.
Akiachak, 827 F.3d at 102.
24.
Id. at 103 (quoting Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Oneida
Cnty., 94 S. Ct. 772, 668 (1974)).
25.
Id. at 103.
26.
Id. (quoting Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t., 118 S.
Ct. 948 (1998)).
27.
Id. (citing Venetie, 522 U.S. at 523-524).
28.
Id. (quoting Venetie, 522 U.S. at 524 (citing 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1695,
1607, 1613)).
29.
Id.
30.
Id.; see Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94–579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2792.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.; see Memorandum from Thomas W. Fredericks, Associate
Solicitor, Indian Affairs, to Forrest Gerard, Assistant Secretary, Indian Affairs 3 (Sept.
15, 1978).
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
35.
Id.
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requiring the DOI “to implement the acquisition of land into trust
procedures without regard to the bar against Alaska tribes [and] to accept
and consider Plaintiff’s request to have lands in Alaska taken into trust.”36
The State of Alaska intervened in the district court to defend the
validity of the Alaska Exception.37 Alaska filed an answer containing
numerous affirmative defenses and a prayer for relief, but no crossclaim
against the DOI or counterclaim against Akiachak, nor any other
crossclaim or counterclaim.38 The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Akiachak and held the Alaska Exception to be in
violation of the IRA.39
The district court ordered the parties to brief the appropriate
remedy.40 Akiachak dropped its injunctive relief claim and asked the court
to remand to the Secretary for “curative rulemaking.”41 The district court
severed and vacated the Alaska Exception in 25 C.F.R. § 151.1.42
Subsequently, the district court granted Alaska’s motion to enjoin the DOI
from converting land into trust pending appeal.43
The DOI initially appealed the district court’s holding, but later
issued and sought comment on a potential rule eliminating the Alaska
Exception.44 The DOI ultimately dropped its appeal and filed a motion to
dismiss Alaska’s appeal for lack of standing.45 Alaska filed a motion to
stop the DOI rulemaking.46 The district court denied Alaska’s motion and
the DOI finalized its rule to remove the Alaska Exception.47
After it issued the final rule to remove the Alaska Exception, the
DOI filed a separate motion to dismiss Alaska’s appeal as moot, and
asserted that its administrative action to remove the Alaska Exception
overtook the district court’s judgment.48 Akiachak joined the DOI on both
motions.49 Alaska opposed both motions and argued that ANCSA prevents
the federal government from acquiring new trust land.50 The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia dismissed Alaska’s appeal for lack
of jurisdiction.51

36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
Id. at 104.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.
Id. (quoting Akiachak Native Cmty. v. Jewell (Akichak II), 995 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2013)).
42.
Id.
43.
Id. (citing Akiachak Native Cmty. v. Jewell (Akichak III), 995 F.
Supp. 2d 7, 18-19 (D.D.C. 2014)).
44.
Id.
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
Id.
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 102.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. The Alaska Exception violated the IRA
The district court opined that the Act of May 1, 1936 “expressly
granted the Secretary authority to take land into trust in Alaska.”52 In its
determination, the district court agreed with Akiachak and the DOI that
such authority survived ANCSA.53 Alaska’s argument that ANCSA
repealed the Secretary’s authority to take land into trust outside of the
Metlakatla reservation was considered, but the district court ultimately
based its decision on the “weight of the textual and structural evidence,
and the strength of the presumption against implicit repeals.”54 The district
court held the Alaska Exception in violation of the IRA’s
antidiscrimination provision because it prevented the Secretary from
considering trust petitions from non-Metlakatlan Alaska Natives.55 While
the court of appeals agreed with the findings of the district court, it vacated
the district court’s decision as moot.56
B. Alaska failed to file a separate, independent claim
Each of Akiachak’s causes of action in its complaint challenged
the soundness of the Alaska Exception.57 Since the DOI invalidated the
Alaska Exception through its revised regulation, the district court lacked
authority “to affect Akiachak’s rights relative to it, thus making this case
classically moot for lack of a live controversy.”58 Jurisdiction to decide a
case or controversy is controlled by the affirmative claims for relief sought
in the complaint, counterclaims, or crossclaims.59
Here, Alaska failed to assert a counterclaim or crossclaim when it
intervened in the district court as a defendant.60 The court of appeals
reasoned, “affirmative defenses made ‘in response to a pleading’ are not
themselves claim for relief.”61 Further, “a request for relief that amounts
to no more than denial of the plaintiff’s demand” is an answer, “not a
separate claim for affirmative relief that expands the court’s
jurisdiction.”62
52.
Id. at 104 (citing Akiachak Native Cmty. v. Salazar (Akiachak I),
935 F. Supp. 2d 195, 203 (D.D.C. 2013)).
53.
Id. (citing Akiachak I, 935 F. Supp. at 203-204).
54.
Id. (quoting Akiachak I, 935 F. Supp. at 208).
55.
Id. (citing Akiachak I, 935 F. Supp. at 210-211).
56.
Id. at 115.
57.
Id. at 105.
58.
Id. at 106.
59.
Id. (“[T]he scope of a federal court’s jurisdiction to resolve a case
or controversy is defined by the affirmative claims to relief sought in the complaint
or…any counterclaims or crossclaims.” Id. “[A] case will remain justiciable only so
long as at least one of those issues remains live.” Id. at 107).
60.
Id. at 107.
61.
Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
62.
Id.
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C. The elimination of the Alaska Exception by the DOI mooted this case
The district court severed and vacated the Alaska Exception
provision in 25 C.F.R. § 151.1 after it ordered the parties to brief the
appropriate remedy.63 While the DOI agreed with the district court’s
severance and vacation of the Alaska Exception, it asserted that this
holding was not the reason the DOI decided to eradicate the Alaska
Exception.64 Instead, it was the DOI’s action that mooted this case.65 The
district court’s ruling was then overtaken by the DOI’s decision to remove
the Alaska Exception.66
After consideration of the history of Alaska Native trust
ownership in Alaska, the DOI established a new rule.67 The DOI
determined that the formulation of a new rule to give Alaska Native Tribes
the ability to take land into trust could encourage and promote economic
development, support Alaska Native Tribes in protecting and providing
for their members, and “give additional tools to Alaska Native
communities to address serious issues,” tribe by tribe.68 Upon eliminating
the Alaska Exception, the DOI concluded that there was “no legal
impediment to taking land into trust in Alaska,” and there are several
reasons to afford Alaska Native Tribes this ability.69 The court of appeals
sided with the DOI’s determination in holding the claim as moot.70
IV. CONCLUSION
The court of appeals decision in Akiachak is relevant to the
development of the status of Alaska Native Tribes within the greater
context of federal Indian policy. Affording Alaska Native Tribes the
ability to apply for land into trust furthers Alaska Native interest in equal
treatment among all federally recognized tribes. Finally, Akiachak
expands tribal sovereignty and self-governance through regulation and
protection by Alaska Natives for Alaska Natives on tribally owned land.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 113 (citing Akiachak III, 995 F. Supp. 2d at 76, 891).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 112.
Id.
Id. at 113.
Id.

